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1 Introduction
I am most honoured to have been invited to give this lecture.
Professor Bill Phillips, in whose memory this lecture is given, was already a
legend at the LSE when I was a graduate student there in the 1970s; by then of
course he had been back in New Zealand for some time. In the LSE basement
there was also the Phillips hydraulic machine with its coloured water ﬂows. How
did Phillips think of his famous curve? I suppose that as an early modeller he
saw that, in the phrase I ﬁrst heard from Harry Johnson at the LSE, there was
a ‘missing equation’; prices and inﬂation were economically indeterminate in
the Keynesian models of Phillips’ days at the LSE. They had to be speciﬁed
exogenously. So Phillips formulated in a practical engineer’s way his Curve.
Irving Fisher had also had a sort of Phillips Curve; but then his Curve was
one for the Classical Model – where its role was quite unclear (was it a supply
curve or an adjustment relation and if the latter why was it needed in a world
of ﬂexible prices?) and it had died with that model, sped to its end by Fisher’s
disastrous forecast that the US economy would quickly recover after 1929. So
the Curve when it took root was named after Bill Phillips; and then of course
there was the massive empirical eﬀort that went with Phillips’ Curve, making
it more than just a theory. So today it is still there at the heart of monetary
economics and my own talk will inevitably be full of it too – as it would have
been even if it had not been the A. W. Phillips Memorial Lecture. That New
Zealand boy done good!
Though I have never been to New Zealand before, it is a country I feel I
know well – not only because of the Lord of the Rings and the recent Test
series! But mainly because of the large scale liberalisation of the economy that
you undertook here, soon after the similar liberalisation of the UK began un-
der Margaret Thatcher. There is much one could say about the parallels and
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1diﬀerences of those two programmes on the supply side. But today I want to
focus on monetary policy, where again there are strong parallels: today both
your central bank and ours carry out inﬂation targeting. This has been an
extremely successful policy. It owes its origins to the relentless campaign un-
dertaken by monetarists in the 1970s and 1980s to restore the central role of
money in controlling inﬂation; if one thinks back to the policies of those times,
one recalls that it was the job of ﬁscal and monetary policy to maintain full
employment, and that of incomes and price controls to hold down inﬂation. We
are fortunately a long way from such ideas today; inﬂation targeting has fulﬁlled
in practice the key objectives of monetarism without using explicit monetarist
methods. Central bankers today are all monetarists in inspiration even if they
are using models that have progressed well beyond those used by the original
monetarists.
Both our economies have experienced much greater stability since inﬂation
itself was stabilised by this policy: the variance of GDP growth has fallen since
1992 by 85% in the US, 82% in the UK, and 59% in New Zealand. It is almost
as if the eﬀective anchoring of inﬂation expectations has removed a major cause
of instability in real variables as well, illustrated in Figures 1—4. Given this
success, it may seem churlish to say that we could do better. But that is my
theme today. I am going to argue that we now have within our grasp the
possibility of returning the world to one with long-term price level stationarity,
such as for centuries existed under the rule of Gold, which I will for simplicity
call the gold standard. Only whereas the price level under gold could depart
from its long-run level for a decade or more, under today’s ﬁat currencies the
price level could be stabilised close to its long-run level over the shorter term as
well. Additionally this deterministic level could be designed to rise steadily along
some path – say 2% a year as with today’s inﬂation target. The diﬀerence from
inﬂation targeting would be that it would always return to this path whereas
of course under inﬂation targeting, whatever happens to prices in one period
is rolled over into the next as the new base for next period’s inﬂation. To use
the language of time-series the price level would be I(0) whereas under inﬂation
targeting it is I(1), even if they shared a common deterministic trend.
Why would it be a good thing to have a stationary price level? Let me
start with some quite general observations based on the shared common sense
of economists – perhaps a dangerous concept! – before going on to talk about
model-based explorations of this policy.
The price level is the exchange value of money for goods; the objects of
people’s utility are however goods. If the price level is expected to return to some
stable value then plans for goods purchase and supply over time can be priced
in money terms with the certainty that this prices them intertemporally as well
(up to the variability associated with future current errors). Hence the real
interest rate, the real price of intertemporal substitution, has less uncertainty
surrounding it. But committing to this future price level is costless if people
incorporate the commitment rationally into their expectations; it simply ties
down a free variable, the nominal anchor so to speak. Under inﬂation targeting
the variance surrounding future prices rises the further in the future the period.
This uncertainty aﬀects in an extreme way the issuing of long-term nominal
contracts, such as long term bonds or wage contracts. Now one can say in reply
that the absence of such nominal contracts does not obviously matter since












































































































Figure 1: Inﬂation in the US, the UK and New Zealand























































































Figure 2: US Real GDP Growth
























































































Figure 3: UK Real GDP Growth
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Figure 4: New Zealand Real GDP Growth
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Figure 5: Comparison of Inﬂation- and Price-targeting
are what they care about, there is just as much market completeness. However
indexation has imperfections, both of timing and of exactness; hence indexed
contracts seem unlikely to be as eﬃcient as nominal ones in eﬀecting a swap of
future for present purchasing power.
In addition to this argument from uncertainty and markets there is the
practical question of the ‘zero bound’ on nominal interest rates. In this era of
low inﬂation it has worried central bankers considerably that a serious recession
could require large interest rate cuts; yet these might be limited by the zero
bound at which the demand for money becomes essentially indeterminate, so
that we are caught in a liquidity trap and unable to help the economy recover.
The problem is at its worst when prices are falling – a deﬂation – since then at
the zero bound real interest rates remain positive. This concern has led policy
authorities to choose inﬂation targets away from zero – typically 2% as we
know – so that there is ‘room’ for nominal interest rates to fall. If normal real
5interest rates are 3%, then normal nominal interest rates would be 3+2=5%.
Under inﬂation targeting an interest rate at the zero bound would then be a
real interest rate of −2%, the minimum it could reach. However under price
level targeting the implied future inﬂation is the deterministic inﬂation path
element, again 2%, plus any current deviation of prices below the path. Hence
taking the worst case, if an economy in recession suﬀered from deﬂation and
current prices fell 2% in the past year against a target rise of 2%, then at the
zero bound the real interest rate would be −6%.Today we have the example of
Japan over the last decade and a half to instruct us in the dangers of deﬂation
and the zero bound. Had Japan had a price level target it could well have got
out of its recession sooner; as it is we are not yet sure if its current recovery will
end its deﬂationary malaise.
It is worth dwelling on this point in the context of the gold standard. One
should be able to ﬁnd useful data bearing on the eﬀectcs of price-level stability
from this era. However it is pretty clear that the nineteenth century was a
period of some fairly large booms and slumps, in which prices both fell and rose
for a decade or more at a time, price level stability was there in the long term
but it was very long term. Price-level stability in the sense intended here is
much shorter term; indeed in the experiments I will report later it is immediate.
So at this stage it is hard to know what lessons we can extract from the era of
gold.
Now I must hasten to say that I am not in a position to convince you
ﬁnally of the arguments I have just advanced. They are just conjectures in the
absence of all the hard work that would need to be done to establish them,
either theoretically or empirically. But this is a talk not a paper and in a talk
– as perhaps in a bar! – we should unbend and let our minds ﬂoat a little.
Furthermore I hope to oﬀer some bits of theory and evidence that I think point
the way.
What I want to do now is talk about some of the other issues that arise
in the targeting debate and also discuss work that has been done to assess the
optimality of price level targeting.
2 Related Issues
Other considerations involved in price level targeting
Two aspects of this policy debate essentially concern the deterministic ele-
ment in either an inﬂation or a price level target rather than the question of
which of these should be targeted.
Money as a transactions technology medium is costless to create and so its
marginal use cost (the rate of interest) should be equated with its zero creation
cost – this led Friedman to argue for a zero nominal interest rate, implying a
rate of deﬂation equal to the real rate of interest. If applied strictly this would
imply a constant deﬂation target equal to the real rate of interest; however
in practice one would get most of the beneﬁts if the deterministic element in
the price level target were ﬁxed as a rate of deﬂation rather than of inﬂation.
Plainly the Friedman argument cuts across the stabilisation argument from the
zero bound..
Money growth generates the inﬂation tax as a source of government revenue.
In public ﬁnance, diﬀerent taxes create diﬀerent distortions; it is optimal, on its
6own, that the marginal distortion per unit of revenue be equated across taxes.
Thus the inﬂation tax should be raised on this view until the marginal distortion
on a unit of revenue be equal to that from general income tax. This argument
might point to a positive deterministic rate of inﬂation; however in practice the
size of money holdings are so small in most developed countries that the yield
of the inﬂation tax is trivial.
Other aspects concern the use of monetary policy to aﬀect the macro econ-
omy.
Thus there are other distortions in the economy due to market imperfec-
tions. Money growth and consequent inﬂation may help to alleviate these; for
example in a sticky-price world higher inﬂation may reduce excess price mar-
gins. However this argument relies on the use of price shocks to aﬀect real
variables systematically; sticky-price setting would come to anticipate such pol-
icy behaviour and create an inﬂation bias in the manner of Barro and Gordon’s
model.
Then money is of course the major instrument of stabilisation; price level
targeting is a part of feedback policy used in stabilisation. From this viewpoint
it is not obvious that price level targeting is helpful in the normal course of
the business cycle (other than in zero bound conditions). Some have argued
that the implied reversal of price errors could be a source of GDP variability.
As noted by Svensson (1999a), the consensus of earlier authors (Hall, 1984;
Duguay, 1994; Bank of Canada, 1994; Fischer, 1994) has been that targeting
prices rather than inﬂation (and presumably also by implication money rather
than its growth rate) would lower long-term price variance at the expense of
higher short-term inﬂation and output variance. As he puts it ‘The intuition is
straightforward: in order to stabilize the price level under price-level targeting,
higher-than-average inﬂation must be succeeded by lower-than-average inﬂation
... (apparently implying) ... higher inﬂation variability ... (which) ... via
nominal rigidities ... would then seem to result in higher output variability.’
With such a wide range of considerations bearing on money it is not sur-
prising that the literature is widely spread in usually non-intersecting groups.
Typically each group has taken one aspect of money and explored optimal money
behaviour for that aspect alone. Thus for example Friedman himself talks of
optimal deﬂation in one place while proposing money supply growth rules (for
stabilisation) in another.
My aim is to examine the merits of price-level targeting in a variety of theo-
retical set-ups. I begin by reviewing, extremely succinctly, the recent literature
that has urged the desirability of price level targeting.
3 The Literature of price-level targeting
‘Orthodox macro’ models
The ﬁrst strand has been what we will call ‘orthodox macro’. If one partitions
a model into aggregate demand and aggregate supply components, the latter
can be thought of as a Phillips Curve with a ‘supply’ shock. Then monetary
policy can be thought of as reacting to supply shocks and demand shocks – see
Minford and Peel (2003) for an account.
The main argument to come out of this group of papers has been that, with a
standard expectations-augmented Phillips Curve, with some sort of overlapping
7wage or price contracts, the introduction of a price level target acts to ‘discipline’
discretionary monetary policy in the absence of feasible Walsh contracts adding
linear state-dependent penalty terms. Thus this literature treats targeting as
a contract with the Central Bank set by government in order to deal with
time-inconsistency biases. These biases are both steady-state inﬂation bias and
excess-stabilisation bias.
Because there are rational expectations and the contracts’ overlap expires
eﬀectively within a fairly short period, this contract extension comes with lit-
tle cost in terms of output instability from having to claw back excess price
movements in future periods. In fact in Svensson’s original one-period contract
setting there is a ‘free lunch’ (in the manner of Sargent and Wallace) because
feedback policy has no eﬀect on output. Empirical explorations of various forms
of price level rules have all tended to ﬁnd minimal output stability cost but gains
in bias due to the fettering of discretion.
A further strand has been added by those examining the regime responses of
parameters of contracts, held constant in the above literature. There is a large
earlier literature due to Fischer and Gray on the optimal indexation parameter.
Building on this Minford et al (2003) ﬁnd that a price level regime tends to
reduce indexation (implicitly lengthening nominal contracts) because it reduces
the persistence of price shocks that would disturb the real outcomes of long-lived
nominal contracts. Reduced indexation also notably ﬂattens the Phillips Curve
which increases the economy’s stability in response to supply shocks. Adding
this eﬀect of price level targeting greatly enhances its macro desirability.
These contributions are fairly robust to the exact speciﬁcation of the macro
model used, provided it remains close to the expectations-augmented Phillips
Curve set-up with overlapping contracts creating a degree of ﬁnite persistence
from nominal shocks. Thus for example Minford and Peel (2003a) report that if
the same indexation response was allowed for in the Liverpool forecasting model
of the UK the results were broadly similarly favourable to price level targeting
to those from a calibrated representative-agent model. I shall return to these
results later as perhaps not surprisingly it is this type of model that I want to
back here today. These models ignore the related issues above on the grounds
that the deterministic of the price-level target as as tax/subsidy policy can be
used to address them: the deterministic component has to be chosen to trade
oﬀ inﬂation tax, the optimal use of money and the zero-bound issues.
3.1 New neo-Keynesian Synthesis models
Side by side with this orthodox macro model literature has sprung up in the
past decade a New Neo-Keynesian Synthesis (NNS) model literature where the
Phillips Curve is derived from Calvo contracts where the nominal rigidity is
extremely persistent, because the chance for a ﬁrm to change its price is limited
and it may therefore never get to change its price at all. Therefore any movement
in the general price level implies that relative prices between producers are being
pushed away from their optimum (ﬂex-price) equilibrium.
In these models the causation runs from output to prices, unlike in the or-
thodox curve where it runs from price shocks to output. Prices when changed by
those with the chance reﬂect their expectations of future marginal cost, proxied
with rising cost curves by future capacity utilisation (the output deviation from
t h e‘ n o r m a l ’o r‘ n a t u r a l ’o r‘ t r e n d ’r a t e ) . P r o p e r l ys p e a k i n gt h e r ei sn o‘ s u p -
8ply shock’ in this relationship. It follows pretty obviously that if policy-makers
can ﬁx the output level so as to prevent prices from moving at all, it will stop
the disequilibrium from mis-set relative producer prices. Thus in these models,
provided there are no other distortions to worry about, the optimal monetary
policy is to stabilise the price level perfectly.
A number of papers have examined how robust this result is to adding in such
other distortions – Collard and Dellas (2003). The answer so far seems to be
that it is pretty robust in numerical terms for the usual calibrations; eﬀectively
the relative price distortion dominates the eﬀects of the others quantitatively.
One can criticise the NNS models for a variety of reasons – see Minford
and Peel (2003a and b). One concern is whether such a price level rule could be
adhered to in the face of mistakes of policy that allowed prices to depart from
the price level target; once a mistake has occurred it is then optimal to ﬁx prices
at the new level because those whose prices are out of equilibrium will not nec-
essarily be brought back by price reversal while others as yet undisturbed may
be pushed out of equilibrium.1 Thus there is a fundamental time-inconsistency
problem with the optimal price level rule in NNS models; and in eﬀect it should
best be thought of as a zero-inﬂation targeting rule It does not in practice
support a price level target in the sense meant here.
Nevertheless this approach has commanded a large following; the usual rea-
sons given have been that a) variants of it work well empirically (Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Evans, 2002) and that b) bounded rationality supports price-
setting of the Calvo sort as a reasonable rule of thumb procedure, especially if
backward indexing to general inﬂation is added in. Again I shall return to these
models below and explain why I do not think they are reliable guides to policy.
3.2 Learning and robustness
A third class of models involves learning (producing forms of adaptiveness in
expectations) – and like the orthodox macro it ignores the related issues of
inﬂation tax etc. for the same reasons. An example is Aoki and Nikolov (2003)
who add central bank learning about the economy’s parameters. They ﬁnd
that in this context adding an ‘integral’ control term in the form of price level
targeting – such rules, they say, ‘automatically undo past policy mistakes’.
Such integral control was found in an earlier literature pre-rational expectations
to be generally helpful for stabilisation in complex dynamic structures. This
set of models are attractive for dealing with situations where policy is in ﬂux;
however here I am arguing about a settled long term policy regime, evolving
rather easily and naturally from our current inﬂation targeting regime, and for
this experiment learning does not seem appropriate.
1The best thing to do strictly depends on the chances of being allowed to change your
price. If it is low (the usual assumption), then it is best to keep the new price level as there is
a low chance of those who already changed their price being allowed to change it back. If it is
high (over 50%), then reversal could be worthwhile as there is a good chance that those who
already changed could change back. The break-even chance is 50%; below this it is optimal
to keep the new price level.
94 Reactions – how should one proceed to eval-
uate the price-level rule for money?
4.1 The NNS model’s failings
As we have seen the Calvo-style models do not actually support price-level
targeting – eﬀectively they make a case for inﬂation targeting. The learning
models do; but we are interested in the price rule as a steady-state rule where
it is reasonable to assume people have learnt about it. So this support is not of
much use unless one believes that people continuously learn and never converge.
This leaves the ‘orthodox’ models described above, which do give some support
and which I want to explore further below.
But ﬁrst I need to spend some time on the NNS models which have in recent
years come to be very widely used; McCallum has referred to them as ‘canonical’
which presumably implies they have received some sort of professional blessing.
As we have seen they essentially oppose price level targeting for the simple
reason that once prices have been set at a new level, certain producers (those
who could not change) have their prices out of line with fundamentals which is
costly in lost surplus. Allowing prices to change again would cause yet more
producers to have prices out of line with fundamentals. So it is best to stop
prices changing further from wherever they are – an inﬂation target. This is
done by manipulating the fundamental so that there is no incentive for those
who can change price actually to do so.
Under the NNS model this is a powerful result and as we have seen robust
to other considerations. Recently Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba have found that
rather large social costs emerge when the inﬂation target rule is violated; in
fact if there is wage-setting as opposed to price-setting, the costs emerge when
a wage inﬂation rule is violated. These costs are large because as prices (or
wages) change those who are left behind and cannot change become more and
more out of line with fundamentals. As the change accumulates the lost surplus
associated with these outlier agents becomes very large.
Yet there is something inherently absurd about the idea that some price –
or wage-setters are completely unable ever to ‘catch up’ with fundamentals due
to general inﬂation. What became of the idea of indexing? Various authors
have proposed ad hoc indexing, either to ‘core’ inﬂation or to lagged inﬂation.
However the natural and optimal thing to index to is the rationally-expected
inﬂation rate. In a recent paper David Peel and I have shown that this entirely
stops the misallocation and mispricing involved, except in the period of an
unanticipated shock to the fundamental; once that is over everyone works out
how to reset their price appropriately because the movement of those who can
reset relative prices is anticipated by those who cannot, so built into expected
inﬂation and thereby eﬀectively frustrated.
The key point is that inﬂation – a nominal variable – cannot logically cause
relative price distortions for any length of time. For those involved the cost
would be prohibitive and surely induce some sort of indexing scheme. However
in their literal use without indexing these models create huge costs from nominal
rigidity. which are highly implausible for this reason.
It follows that these models are unlikely to give us much of a guide to the
costs of diﬀerent monetary policies, popular as they are.
10The main reason macroeconomists seem to remain attached to the NNS
model, ignoring its blatant theoretical shortcomings, is in fact empirical. It
seems to match the facts of inﬂation persistence, especially in the version with
lagged indexation which yields the version with both expected future and lagged
inﬂation. Furthermore monetary economists feel that the macroeconomic facts
support Friedman’s hump-shaped response of output and inﬂation to a monetary
shock; models with this Phillips Curve can be set up (for example Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Evans) to generate such responses. However this empirical
matching is, I believe, misleading.
Begin with inﬂation persistence. If you look at quite recent facts, this per-
sistence has very largely disappeared. Just take a look at the recent deviations
of US, UK and NZ inﬂation from their mean (Figure 1 again). Transparently
they are nearly random; in fact the ﬁrst order autocorrelation parameters since
1992 are respectively 0.19, −0.36 and 0.28, a lot lower than the 0.5—0.7 range of
the 1970s and even negative in the case of the UK. Yet if the source of persis-
tence was a stable Phillips Curve of this sort, the persistence should be stable.
If one wants to account for inﬂation persistence, one can more likely look to
two main sources; one is the persistence of output, investment and other real
variables in the face of productivity shocks, the other – probably the main
one – is the persistence of monetary regimes generating inﬂation itself. Have
we not lived through periods of high and persistent inﬂation produced by gov-
ernments and central banks themselves? Have we not had endless discussions
when we were trying to bring inﬂation down of how ‘core’ inﬂation could only
be brought down cautiously, gradually, opportunistically etc? Ordinary pri-
vate people could be forgiven for having persistent inﬂation expectations based
on such policies. Nowadays it has all changed; inﬂation was painfully broken
and the new regime of inﬂation targeting put in place with independent central
banks to embed and solidify the new environment. Put this new regime in place
with a standard surprise Phillips Curve and you will get very little persistence,
in line with recent facts.
As for this model matching those hump-shaped responses, this is a put-up
job. The hump-shaped responses themselves have been ‘found’ in VARs by a
process of identiﬁcation informed by the very desire to ﬁnd such responses. It
is just not clear that the model in its entirety ﬁts the unrestricted VAR facts.
We know that the model can be made to reproduce this one response found
under the restrictions on the VAR; but we do not know whether the model
replicates the other implied parameters of the VAR. The identiﬁcation of the
VAR has forced the facts to produce a hump-shaped response which the model
can replicate: but can it replicate the other facts this identiﬁcation implies?
What one would like to know is whether the unrestricted VAR can reject the
model or not. This can be done by bootstrapping the model, generating the
distribution of the implied VAR coeﬃcients and checking whether the actual
estimated VAR coeﬃcients lie within the implied 95% conﬁdence limits. This
would be a generalisation of the RBC methodology of matching unconditional
moments, cross-correlations at diﬀerent lags and so forth. I am honestly not
sure what it would produce as it has not yet to my knowledge been used on
these or other macro models. But until it is done we really cannot say that we
should abandon rationally-based models in favour of this NNS one. My guess,
based on extension of the argument above about inﬂation persistence, is that the
orthodox rational expectations models, as I have termed them (embodying the
11real business cycle with some ﬁnite wage contract overlap to provide a degree
of nominal rigidity), would be at least as capable as this one of capturing the
facts of the business cycle and inﬂation.
As they say in the north of England, “you cannot refute owt wi’ nowt.”
As long as there is no alternative, the canonical model may continue to rule
supreme. Thus it is necessary to come up with a model that can estimate the
costs of diﬀerent monetary rules, which in practice means a model of nominal
rigidity so that money has real eﬀects. For this we revert to what I called earlier
the orthodox macro model. Let us now examine it a bit more carefully.
4.2 Reexamining the orthodox macro model
It is my basic contention that we have not yet got to the stage where we have
to scrap fairly straightforward optimising models with rational expectations in
favour of relationships with explicit irrationality (or limited rationality) like the
NNS one we have just been discussing. The methods we now have access to in
order to specify these models, identify their error processes (including such ideas
as periodic regime switching) and then use them stochastically to test whether
they are rejected by the unvarnished facts do not yet appear to have been used.
So what I am now going to set out is a basic model of this type that I hope will
be an early candidate for this sort of testing.
The most basic model one can write down that satisﬁes full rationality and
has no ad hoc elements is the real business cycle model. This model is deeply
satisfying as an account of cycles in say the nineteenth century when the supply
of money (gold) was rather stable and cycles appear to have been driven to a
large extent by technological changes. The basic RBC mechanism is that of
Harrod and Domar applied to a model of voluntary unemployment; for example
a permanent productivity shock raises permanent income and so consumption
but also unleashes a rise in investment to raise the capital stock in line. This
drives up real interest rates to ration demand to the available supply of output;
also real wages to ration demand for labour to the available supply. One might
add that in an open economy it also drives up the real exchange rate to satisfy
uncovered interest parity consistently with long run requirements of current
account balance. This mechanism has a beautiful simplicity and power.
To make money matter, which seems to me at least a reasonable require-
ment, we need a source of nominal rigidity But we have just considered and I
hope rejected the NNS one. Then there are Taylor contracts, in a wide variety
of forms. All of these also create very long nominal lags and cause a viola-
tion of the strong natural rate hypothesis (as do the Calvo ones) – viz that it
should be impossible to change real variables by a fully-anticipated change in
the money supply. However the idea of nominal overlapping wage contracts is
attractive, does have some obvious factual basis from common observation of
industrial practice and can be justiﬁed theoretically as a form of worker insur-
ance against income/consumption variation. A simple way of operationalising
the idea without violating the strong natural rate hypothesis is to allow these
contracts to vary wages within the contract period in a precommitted way: this
seems entirely reasonable since if prices are rising at 10% a year it makes sense
in a three-year contract to pre-set wages to rise by 10% a year and not to be
ﬁxed throughout. In addition it makes sense to allow a degree of indexation, to
be chosen endogenously according to the monetary regime. To this I would add
12an element of ‘spot’ wage contracting, where some part of the labour market
receives the current equilibrium or free market wage. I explored a model of this
type in my recent EJ paper.
4.3 Price-level targeting – some results
Let us now examine whether within some such model as I have sketched out
above it is beneﬁcial to target the price level. I shall look at the issue entirely in
terms of ‘stabilisation’ which I take to be the central issue of monetary macro
(as opposed to supply-side macro). I mentioned various other issues – mostly
optimal tax questions. But I shall assume for the purpose of our analysis that
these are separable and can be dealt with by a combination of tax/subsidy
policy and suitable selection of the deterministic target path for prices, so freeing
monetary policy to set a regime optimal for stabilisation. Furthermore in dealing
with stabilisation I shall also assume that the zero bound is somehow not a
problem; implicitly I am assuming that it is taken care of by a combination of
setting the deterministic path for prices suﬃciently steeply over time and the
price-level target’s automatic stabilising eﬀect close to the bound.
I cannot pretend that either of the two models whose results I am going to
oﬀer you have passed the test I described earlier. One (Table 1) is a forecasting
model – an early vintage rational expectations model that has been used with
moderate success to forecast the UK for two and a half decades – the Liver-
pool Model of the UK. It approximates, in the manner argued by McCallum
and Nelson, to the structure set out above. But it is not that exact structure
explicitly.
The other is close to the structure set out above and is purely calibrated,
not estimated or tested in terms of its ability to ﬁt the dynamic facts (Table 2.)
I t sm a i nd i ﬀ e r e n c ef r o mt h es t r u c t u r ea b o v ei st h a tc o n s u m e r sa r ep r e v e n t e d
from borrowing to smooth their consumption; this is to motivate them strongly
to sign wage contracts that smooth consumption instead, as the main focus of
the model is on this wage contract structure. In later work we hope to relax
this strong constraint in favour of some borrowing-arrangement-cost motivation.
But notice one thing that our framework implies: the optimal world is not
the ﬂex-price equilibrium because workers want to insure themselves against
all disturbances to their consumption. This is why they sign wage contracts;
in the Calvo-contract world by contrast the ﬂex-price equilibrium is best, the
inability to change prices is an obstruction of what people would like best to
do – viz change prices ﬂexibly – and the aim of monetary policy is somehow
to circumvent the eﬀect of this obstruction. In our world here the inability to
change wages is something put in place in order to increase expected utility; the
contracts enhance welfare compared with the ﬂex-price world of no contracts –
they have an explicit rationale.
The models by no means being what one would ideally like in either case,
the results I will show you are illustrative of what price-level targeting can do,
I would claim no more. What they illustrate is the power of regime change
to aﬀect the behaviour of people – as in the Lucas critique. I started out
by observing that we seem to have much more stable macro economies since
inﬂation targeting had settled down; this suggests that behaviour has responded
in a beneﬁcial way to this new regime. I have not been able to give you a
worked-out understanding of just how: our models suggest stabilising inﬂation
13standard error in parenthesis+
Inﬂation-target = 100 Indexation Welfare Var Var
(%) #1 #2 (cons.) (unemp.)
Inﬂation-targeting 80 100 100 100 100
(1.3) (1.3) (1.3)
Price-level targeting 80 102.3 120∗∗ 71∗∗ 91∗∗
(holding indexation ﬁxed)
Price-level targeting 0 102.4 120∗∗ 70∗∗ 92∗∗
(indexation endogenous)





is the number of sample observations (here 12078) – source Wallis, 1995
Deﬁnition: #1 is the standard CRRA formula in the text; #2 is the weighted average
(weight on consumption =0 .7, on unemployment =1 .0)o ft h et w o( i n v e r t e d )v a r i a n c e s .
∗ signiﬁcant at 5% level
∗ signiﬁcant at 1% level
Table 1: Inﬂation- and price-level targeting within the Liverpool Model
standard error in parenthesis+
Money—growth-target =1 0 0 Indexation Welfare Var Var
(%) #1 #2 (cons.) (unemp.)
Money—growth-targeting 71 100 100 100 100
(=inﬂation targeting (3) (3) (3)
in this model)
Money-level targeting 71 100 100 102 93∗
(holding indexation ﬁxed)
Money-level targeting 37 102 113∗∗ 100 56∗∗
(indexation endogenous)





is the number of sample observations (here 2000) – source Wallis, 1995
Deﬁnition: #1 is the standard CRRA formula in the text; #2 is the weighted average
(weight on consumption =0 .7, on unemployment =1 .0)o ft h et w o( i n v e r t e d )v a r i a n c e s .
∗ signiﬁcant at 10% level
∗ signiﬁcant at 1% level
Table 2: Inﬂation- and price-level targeting within a calibrated model
14may reduce both demand and supply shocks. But in the case of price-level
targeting I believe I can suggest how it might well be beneﬁcial.
The mechanism echoes an old one, ﬁrst set out by Lucas in 1972 when he
examined the slope of the Phillips curve under varying inﬂation regimes which
he summarised by inﬂation volatility. The greater the volatility the steeper
the Phillips curve slope. Rather similar ideas were put forward by by Stanley
Fischer and Joanna Gray about indexation; higher volatility would induce higher
indexation which too would steepen the Phillips Curve. However I would like
to suggest a twist on this story. The puzzle about indexation, ﬁrst noted by
Barro, is why it is not comprehensive; plainly if it were costless and perfect it
would be since people care about real outcomes. Fischer and Gray postulated
an imperfection where people could not deliver a real wage appropriate to the
shock because of an inability to observe the shock; hence indexation oﬀers a
compromise response to shocks between workers and ﬁrms. The imperfection
we suggest is diﬀerent; since ﬁrms are risk-neutral and workers want insurance
what exactly the shock is does not matter for us. But we have indexation that is
ineﬃcient because it is paid with a lag. This is important in the presence of unit
root – i.e. totally persistent – shocks, like productivity. When for example
productivity changes permanently it changes prices permanently; if you are tied
into a purely nominal wage this shocks real wages throughout your contract
period. Indexation with a lag is helpful as it oﬀsets the shock to real wages
after its lag in arriving.
In the presence of temporary shocks to prices however indexation is actually
positively harmful to stability. If you had your purely nominal wage contract
the shock would arrive, change your real wage and go away. With an indexed
contract the shock would arrive, shock real wages and go away; but then it
would be succeeded by a further shock to real wages as indexation kicked in.
It follows that it is the persistence of shocks to prices that determines the
degree of indexation. The more persistent the more indexation and hence also
the steeper the Phillips Curve. Apply this to price level targeting; assume that
this takes the form of setting interest rates or money supply so as to ensure
that next period prices will return to target. (For realism allow this policy to
be carried out with a trembling hand so that there is some monetary policy or
demand error.) Price-level targeting in eﬀect implies that prices are stationary,
so errors are entirely non-persistent. Hence it reduces indexation sharply and
ﬂattens the Phillips Curve.
This is welfare-enhancing because it implies that the economy is very stable
in response to supply shocks – Figure 6. As for demand shocks these are largely
the result of the authorities’ own errors. Keep these down, is the moral, and
you will have a stable economy if you pursue price level targeting.
This account works well for the calibrated model discussed above. It works
poorly, it must be confessed, for the Liverpool Model. This can be seen clearly
from Table 1 for the Liverpool Model’s results. The gain in stability and welfare
occurs between rows 1 and 2, which both retain the same level of (high) index-
ation. Between rows 2 and 3, indexation drops to zero but there is no further
gain to speak of; essentially the stability of both real wages and unemployment
are the same between the two rows, even though indexation drops so sharply.
What is going on?
First, we can note that the great improvement in stability both for real
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Figure 6: Eﬀect of Indexation on Stability
targeting greatly reduces the variability of private wealth: price-level targeting
makes the real price of bonds more stable because it makes the variability of
the price level so much smaller (thus future bond prices are set in nominal
terms by the nominal rate of interest which in turn depends on the real rate
plus the expected rate of inﬂation; but future real bonds prices are additionally
dependent on the future price level). In the Liverpool Model private wealth has
strong demand eﬀects on private consumption and investment; thus dampening
its variability dampens an important demand shock.
Second, while the mechanism we describe above in the calibrated model does
indeed work to dampen the eﬀects of supply shocks which are the main source
of shocks in the calibrated model, we must stress that this mechanism in fact
exaggerates the eﬀect of demand shocks on output and unemployment. (The
mechanism also involves steepening of the aggregate demand curve; and this
can lead to a further exaggeration of demand shocks on prices and so on real
wages.) Hence between rows 2 and 3 what is happening is that the demand
shocks of the Liverpool Model, which are wide-ranging by comparison with the
calibrated model, are causing the reduction of indexation to have a negligible
overall eﬀect on stability of either real wages or unemployment – basically the
dampening eﬀect on supply shocks is being oﬀset by the exaggerating eﬀect on
demand shocks.
In sum what the Liverpool Model shows pre-eminently is the importance of
wealth shocks to demand and the way in which price-level targeting helps to
make the economy more stable by dampening these. It also by the way indicates
16the way in which inﬂation targeting may have made the economy more stable
– by stabilising nominal interest rates and so nominal bond prices.
5 Conclusions
I have argued today that, even though monetary policy has made great strides
by moving to inﬂation targeting, by moving to price level targeting it can be
improved further. My main argument has been that it would make the world
safer for nominal long term contracts. I have illustrated this argument by the
case of wage contracts whose formation are rather central to the operation of
monetary policy. Essentially I have argued that price level targeting would re-
duce indexation and so lengthen wage contracts in eﬀect; this in turn would
make economies more stable. In setting out this argument I have made some
detours into widely popular alternative models, especially that of Calvo con-
tracts, and argued that they are not good guides to this important policy area
where indeed they lead to diﬀerent policy conclusions.
Let me end by apologising for setting out before you a confection made up
of bits and pieces – conjectures, models without all the features that would
have been desirable and so on – rather than a solid ﬁnished construction. But
as I said at the start, this has been a talk, as if in a well-stocked bar; this
is an activity which I think is both good for us to indulge in and potentially
enjoyable! I hope at least my prolonged chat has kept you awake and suﬃciently
stimulated to provoke some further interaction now.
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